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We set up a three-ﬁrm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger
affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of
relocation affects the proﬁtability of the merger, particularly for the non-partici-
pating ﬁrm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or
locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we ﬁnd that a merger will
generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of reloca-
tion is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers’
transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values
for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility
of relocation could solve the ‘‘merger paradox’’.
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1 Introduction
In imperfectly competitive markets, an important part of the strategic
interaction among ﬁrms occurs along a spatial dimension. More speciﬁ-
cally, the proﬁtability of a given ﬁrm is in many cases highly dependent
on the ﬁrm’s location, relative to its competitors. Thus, to the extent that a
ﬁrm is able to inﬂuence its own location, this is one of the most important
decisions to be made. Location can be interpreted in a geographical
space, where the locational decision involves the physical location of
production plants or outlets, or in the product space. With the latter
interpretation, the strategic decision involves the types and ranges of
product varieties offered by the ﬁrm.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic importance of
spatial competition for ﬁrms’ incentives to merge or collude. More spe-
ciﬁcally, we want to examine how a merger, or partial collusion along one
or more dimensions, affects ﬁrms’ incentives to relocate from an initial
position. The possibility of relocation will, in turn, affect the incentives
for merger or collusion.
The importance of relocation in merger analysis is motivated by the
casual observation that corporate mergers are often accompanied by
some structural changes in the spatial dimension. For instance, we
often observe that a merged ﬁrm spends considerable resources on
rebranding – in order to create a new image in the eyes of consumers
– and product repositioning.1;2 Another, more speciﬁc, example of
spatial location is departure ‘‘slots’’ at airports. Airlines do not only
decide the prices, but also the time scheduling of their different ﬂights.
Since the proﬁtability of different departure times (i.e., locations) is
inﬂuenced by the ﬂight schedules of competing airlines, any changes in
market concentration, e.g., through mergers, are expected to affect the
optimal choices of ‘‘slots’’.3
In some markets it is also reasonable to expect that mergers affect
locations in the geographical space. Strategic relocation of the kind we
1 The possibility of product repositioning is also acknowledged in the Eur-
opean Commission’s recent draft notice on the appraisal of horizontal mergers:
‘‘In some markets it may be relatively easy and not too costly for the active
ﬁrms to reposition their products... The Commission will examine whether the
possibility of repositioning or product line extension by the merging parties or
competitors may inﬂuence the incentive of the merged entity to raise prices’’
(European Commission, 2002, paragraph 37).
RBB Economics (2003) provides examples of such post-merger repositioning
in the cruise industry.
2 In a related, but quite different paper, Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) analyse
the possibilities of introducing a new product, or withdrawing an existing brand,
in a context of horizontal merger. In another study, Berry and Waldfogel (2001)
analyse empirical evidence of the effect of mergers on variety and product
repositioning in US local radio broadcasting markets.
3 Indeed, in an empirical analysis of ﬂight departures in the Norwegian airline
market, Salvanes et al. (2004) ﬁnd that changes in the number of competing ﬁrms
lead to systematic changes in the location of departures.
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are considering in this paper is probably most relevant in retail mar-
kets, where consumers’ transportation costs play an important role.4 By
introducing the possibility of (costly) relocation in a simple model of
spatial competition, we show in the present paper that a merger will
generally trigger incentives for relocation.
In the literature on purely anti-competitive horizontal mergers, a mer-
ger is normally assumed strategically to affect only the ﬁrms’ pricing or
output decisions. The seminal contributions are Salant et al. (1983) for the
case of Cournot competition, and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) for
the case of Bertrand competition. A striking feature of these models is the
so-called ‘‘merger paradox’’: a merger between two or more ﬁrms is
always more beneﬁcial for the ﬁrms not participating in the merger.
However, these studies do not allow for the possibility of relocations in
spatial dimensions. The present paper contributes to the literature on
horizontal mergers by showing that relocations of this kind affect the
proﬁtability of a merger, also for non-participating ﬁrms in the industry.
Under some given circumstances, we show that the possibility of relo-
cation could solve the merger paradox.
We set up a model where ﬁrms can undertake a costly investment in
order to relocate from an initial position. This assumption should ﬁt a
broad interpretation of location. If we interpret location in the product
space, it is perhaps most natural to think of the relocation cost as
investment in product R&D. With this interpretation, our paper is also
related to Lin and Saggi (2002), who analyze ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in
product R&D as a way of increasing the degree of product differentiation
in a symmetrically differentiated industry. By assuming a symmetric
Chamberlinian demand system, product R&D has two different effects in
their model. In addition to the differentiation effect, product R&D by one
ﬁrm also increases the demand for all products in the industry by an
equally large amount, which is a somewhat extreme assumption. In the
present paper, we choose a model set-up which focuses exclusively on the
differentiation effect.
4 Anecdot examples include the banking and pharmacy sectors in Norway,
where recent merger waves have been accompanied by a locational restructuring
of branches and outlets. In a related empirical study, Go¨tz and Gugler (2003)
analyse how mergers affect product variety – measured as the number of stations
per sqkm – in the Austrian retail gasoline market.
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With a few exceptions, the effect of mergers on relocation, and vice
versa, has received relatively little attention in the literature. Rothschild
(2000) and Rothschild et al. (2000) analyze the case where three ﬁrms are
initially located on a Hotelling line and can relocate in the anticipation of
a merger between two of the ﬁrms. A problem with this set-up is that the
structure of the industry is ex ante asymmetric, so that the choice of
merger candidates is somewhat arbitrary. Norman and Pepall (2000a;
2000b) solve this problem by assuming that all ﬁrms are initially located
at the market centre, which is a Nash equilibrium in the no-merger game.
The main result in these studies is that the ‘‘merger paradox’’ could be
solved by allowing for the possibility of relocation. However, in addition
to the assumption of Cournot competition, all these studies share the
common feature that ﬁrms are able to price discriminate between con-
sumers at different locations.5 Reitzes and Levy (1995) obtain a similar
result for the case of price discriminating ﬁrms that engage in Bertrand
competition, although this is not due to the possibility of relocation. They
show that a merger between two neighboring ﬁrms is always proﬁtable
for the merger participants, while outside ﬁrms are unaffected by the
merger. Moreover, the assumption of price discriminating ﬁrms implies
that there are no incentives for relocation.
The present paper adds to this literature by departing from the
assumption of price discriminating ﬁrms and analyzing the interaction of
merger and relocation incentives for the case of mill pricing, which is
perhaps a more suitable assumption for spatial competition in product
space. We consider a two-ﬁrm merger in a model where three price-
setting ﬁrms are initially equidistantly located on a circle. This set-up
resembles the analysis of Levy and Reitzes (1992), who show that a side-
by-side merger is always proﬁtable in a model of this kind. However, they
do not consider the possibility of relocation, which is the main objective
of our paper.
We ﬁnd that a merger generally gives the merger participants incentives
to relocate, but the direction of relocation is crucially dependent on the
characteristics of consumers’ transportation costs. Adopting a disutility
function with both a linear and a quadratic component, we ﬁnd that the
merger participants will relocate towards the outside ﬁrm if the weight
attached to the linear part is sufﬁciently high. In this case, we also identify
5 This means that the ﬁrms compete in a continuum of segmented markets.
Similar assumptions are also used by Matsushima (2001) in a Salop model.
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the existence of a set of parameter values for which a merger will be more
proﬁtable for an insider than for the non-participant. Thus, we show that
the possibility of relocation could possibly solve the ‘‘merger paradox’’
even in the absence of price discrimination. This is the main result of the
paper. Regarding welfare considerations, we show that relocation could in
some cases improve locational efﬁciency, thus reducing the negative
impact of the merger.
Finally, we also extend the model to consider partial collusion in either
location or price setting. In this case we ﬁnd that partial collusion of either
kind will always provide incentives for relocation, and the direction of
relocation depends on whether the ﬁrms collude in prices or locations.
2 The Model
Consider a population of consumers uniformly distributed, with a con-
stant density of 1, on a circle with circumference 1. Three single-product
ﬁrms are located on the circle, with the location of ﬁrm i given by xi.
Assuming unit demand, the utility of a consumer located at z 2 0; 1½ , and
buying from ﬁrm i, is given by
U z; v; xi; pið Þ ¼ v pi  t wið Þ; ð1Þ
where
wi ¼ minf z xij j; 1 z xij jg; ð2Þ
v is the reservation utility, assumed to be equal for all consumers, pi is the
price charged by ﬁrm i and t ð Þ is a transportation cost function. We also
assume that v is sufﬁciently high for the market always to be covered, i.e.,
all consumers are active.
Regarding transportation costs, the standard approach is to assume
these costs to be either linear or quadratic in distance. We will adopt a
functional form that encompasses both the linear and the quadratic variant
as special cases. The costs of travelling a distance D is given by6
t Dð Þ ¼ aDþ bD2; a; b  0: ð3Þ
6 A similar cost function is used by Lambertini (2001).
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We introduce the notation z^i for the location of the consumer who is
indifferent between buying the good from the two neighboring ﬁrms i and
iþ 1.7 The location of this consumer is implicitly given by
U z^i; v; xi; pið Þ ¼ U z^i; v; xiþ1; piþ1ð Þ:
Given the locations of the indifferent consumers, the market share of ﬁrm
i is given by
Mi ¼ z^i  z^i1: ð4Þ
We also assume that the ﬁrms can undertake an investment in order to
change their location. We assume that relocation costs are convex in
distance. The cost for ﬁrm i of relocating a distance di is given by kd2i ,
where k is a positive constant.
The marginal cost of production is assumed to be constant and equal
for all ﬁrms and, without loss of generality, equal to zero. Firm i’s proﬁts
are then given by
pi ¼ piMi  kd2i : ð5Þ
The game is played in two stages:
Stage 1: The ﬁrms simultaneously choose the level of investment, di.
Stage 2: The ﬁrms simultaneously set prices, pi.
2.1 Merger
As a benchmark for comparison, we will ﬁrst consider the case in which
all ﬁrms make independent decisions about prices and investments. In this
case the model is completely symmetric. It is easily shown that each ﬁrm,
operating independently, would prefer to be located as far away from its
competitors as possible. Thus, given initial equidistant locations, the ﬁrms
have no incentives to invest in relocation.
7 Because of the geometry of the model, any ﬁrm referred to as j 3n is the
same as ﬁrm j, for every n 2 N :
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Solving for the Nash equilibrium, with di ¼ 0, yields the following
solution for prices and proﬁts:
pi ¼ 3aþ b
9
; ð6Þ
pi ¼ 3aþ b
27
: ð7Þ
The main focus of the analysis in this subsection is to investigate how a
merger may inﬂuence the incentives for relocation. It is well known from
the literature (see, e.g., de Frutos et al., 1999) that, with mill pricing, a
transportation cost function of the type (3) does not provide pure strategy
equilibrium existence in the price subgame for all possible locations.
More precisely, a pure strategy price equilibrium fails to exist if the ﬁrms
are located too closely, since each ﬁrm then has an incentive to engage in
price-undercutting in order to capture the whole market. Thus, in order to
obtain a perfect pure strategy equilibrium of the (re)location-price game,
we follow the approach taken in related location models8 and restrict the
strategy space of the relocation game to the set of locations for which a
pure strategy equilibrium of the price game exists. Let this set be denoted
by Q. Following Economides (1986), we deﬁne the direction in which
@pi=@di is positive as the ‘‘relocation tendency’’ of ﬁrm i. An equilibrium
of the location game must then be at the zero relocation locus,
@pi=@di ¼ 0, and a perfect equilibrium of the location-price game is
deﬁned as the intersection between the zero relocation locus and the
existence set Q . Formally, a location equilibrium, given by the relocation
vector d, exists if
@pi dð Þ
@di
¼ 0; @
2pi dð Þ
@d2i
< 0; xi þ di 2 Q; i ¼ 1; 2; 3:
This condition for equilibrium existence is met if the cost of relocation is
sufﬁciently high. Below we will provide an exact restriction on the
parameter k which guarantees equilibrium existence.
8 See, e.g., Economides (1984; 1986; 1989), Hinloopen and Marrewijk (1999),
Lambertini (2001).
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Given equidistant initial locations, we can assume – without loss of
generality – that the merger participants (ﬁrms 1 and 2) are located at 0
and 13, with the outsider (ﬁrm 3) located at
2
3. Obviously, any relocation for
the merging ﬁrms must be symmetric across both outlets (products), thus
d1 ¼ d2.9 We will henceforth focus on the relocational incentives for the
outlet/product located at 0. To simplify notation, we let d :¼ d1 ¼ d2ð Þ
denote the distance of relocation for the ﬁrm located at 0, measured in the
clockwise direction. Hence, d < 0 implies that the merger participants
relocate in the direction of the outside ﬁrm. Obviously, the outsider has no
incentives to relocate.10 Since the merger participants coordinate their
price setting, the symmetric feature of the model enables us to solve for
the equilibrium by identifying the location of one indifferent consumer
only. Consider the consumer who is indifferent between buying from ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrm 3. Her location, z^3, is found by solving
p1 þ t 1þ d  z^3ð Þ ¼ p3 þ t z^3  2
3
 
:
Using (3), this yields
z^3 ¼ 1
6
5þ 3dð Þ þ 3
2
p1  p3
3aþ bþ 3bd
 
: ð8Þ
Due to symmetry and coordinated price setting, the consumer who is
indifferent between buying from either of the merger participants is
located at z^1 ¼ 16. Furthermore, symmetry also ensures that the market
shares of the merged ﬁrm and the outsider, respectively, are
M1 þM2 ¼ 2 1 z^3 þ 1
6
 
ð9Þ
and
M3 ¼ 2 z^3  2
3
 
: ð10Þ
9 This assumption of symmetry regarding the relocation distances is made to
facilitate the analysis and is not imposed as an exogenous condition. The sym-
metric outcome can be obtained by explicitly solving the game for di , i ¼ 1; 2; 3.
10 Again, besides being an argument derived from the symmetry of the model,
this result can also be obtained as an equilibrium outcome of the relocation game.
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Equilibrium prices, as functions of the optimal degree of relocation, is
found by inserting (8)–(10) into the proﬁt functions, (5), and maximizing
with respect to prices. This yields
p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 1
27
5 3dð Þ 3aþ bþ 3bdð Þ; ð11Þ
p3 ¼ 1
27
4þ 3dð Þ 3aþ bþ 3bdð Þ; ð12Þ
with corresponding proﬁts given by
p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 1
486
5 3dð Þ2 3aþ bþ 3bdð Þ  kd2; ð13Þ
p3 ¼ 1
243
4þ 3dð Þ2 3aþ bþ 3bdð Þ: ð14Þ
Let us ﬁrst consider the effects of a merger between two ﬁrms, without
relocation. With d ¼ 0 the following result can be stated:11
Proposition 1: With three ﬁrms initially located equidistantly from each
other, then (i) a merger between two ﬁrms is always jointly proﬁtable, (ii)
proﬁts are higher for the non-participating ﬁrm.
Proof: (i) Comparing (13) and (7) we ﬁnd that
p1jd¼0pi ¼
7
486
3aþ bð Þ > 0:
(ii) A comparison of (13) and (14) reveals that
p1jd¼0p3jd¼0¼ 
7
486
3aþ bð Þ < 0: (
This is a restatement of Levy and Reitzes (1992), and corresponds to the
well known results in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). The gain from price
11 It can easily be shown that, with d ¼ 0, a price equilibrium exists for all
a > 0, b > 0.
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setting coordination, resulting in higher prices, more than outweighs, in
terms of proﬁts, the loss of market shares for the merger participants.
However, the outside ﬁrm enjoys both higher prices and a higher market
share, implying that free-rider incentives are present: rather than partici-
pating in a merger, each ﬁrm would prefer that the other ﬁrms merge.
Let us now see how a merger between two ﬁrms affects the incentives
to relocate. Since the merging ﬁrms would only spend resources to
relocate their outlets/products if it increases proﬁts, relocation obviously
increases the proﬁtability of a merger. The question is, however, whether
the merging ﬁrms would relocate away from, or in the direction of, the
outside ﬁrm. The optimal distance of relocation is given by
d ¼ argmax p1 þ p2f g:
Using (13), we ﬁnd the explicit value of the interior solution to be
d ¼
18bþ 108k  6a 6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4b aþ bþ 27kð Þ þ a 18kð Þ2
q
18b
: ð15Þ
In order to secure an interior solution12 we make the assumption that
relocation is sufﬁciently costly. More speciﬁcally, we impose the
assumption
k  k ¼ max  1
2
aþ 1
8
b
 
;
3
4
a 21
40
b
  
:
It can also be shown that k  k is sufﬁcient to ensure pure strategy
equilibrium existence in the location-price game.13
Proposition 2: The merger participants will relocate towards (away
from) the outside ﬁrm if a > <ð Þ 12 b.
12 That means, to ensure that
dj j  min 1
6
; 1 z^3
 
:
13 With two ﬁrms only, de Frutos et al. (1999) show that a pure strategy
equilibrium in the price game is always satisﬁed if the ﬁrms are located at least a
distance of 1=4 from each other. This is always the case if k  k. Moreover, with
more than two ﬁrms equilibrium prices are lower, due to ﬁercer competition, so
the incentives for price-undercutting is even lower.
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Proof: Follows from (15). h
The ﬁrst observation to be made is that d is generally nonzero: a
merger between two ﬁrms creates incentives for relocation. Furthermore,
the direction of relocation is generally ambiguous, and depends on the
speciﬁcs of the transportation cost function. It is easy to verify, though,
that @d=@a < 0, @d=@b > 0 and @ dj j=@k < 0.
The merged ﬁrm faces a trade-off in deciding on the direction of relo-
cation: by moving away from the outside ﬁrm price competition is reduced,
at the expense of a lower market share. Alternatively, the merged ﬁrm can
gain a larger share of the market by relocating towards its competitor. The
nature of this trade-off is determined by the characteristics of the trans-
portation cost function. If there is a relatively high degree of convexity in
transportation costs, the degree of price competition is highly dependent on
the distance between the ﬁrms. The further apart the ﬁrms are located, the
more costly it is to ‘‘steal’’ market shares from the competitors, implying
that the degree of competition is relatively lower. Consequently, relocating
further away from their competitor is an effective way for the merger par-
ticipants to reduce the degree of price competition.
On the other hand, if there is a relatively low degree of convexity in
transportation costs, the degree of price competition is not sufﬁciently
reduced to compensate for the reduction of market share by moving
further away from the competing ﬁrm. In this case, the market share effect
dominates the competition effect, and the merged ﬁrm can increase proﬁts
by moving closer to the outside ﬁrm, thereby controlling a larger share of
the total market.
2.1.1 A Special Case: Linear Transportation Costs
The transport cost function speciﬁed in (3) encompasses the two most
commonly used speciﬁcations in the literature on spatial competition: linear
(b ¼ 0) and quadratic (a ¼ 0) transportation costs. In our model, an inter-
esting result appears for the special case of linear transportation costs.14
From Proposition 2, it follows that linear transportation costs implies
relocation towards the outside ﬁrm. Comparing the cases with and without
relocation, we ﬁnd that relocation always leads to higher prices for the
14 The relevant equilibrium expressions for this case is easily found by
inserting lim
b!0
d into (8)–(14). Note also that linear transportation costs implies
k ¼ 34 a.
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merged ﬁrm and lower prices for the outsider. From the viewpoints of the
merging ﬁrms, the cost of charging higher prices is a loss of market share to
the outsider. However, the merger participants can partly compensate for
this effect by moving closer to the outside ﬁrm, which enables the merged
ﬁrms to charge even higher prices. The non-participant, on the other hand,
now faces a higher degree of competition, and is forced to reduce its price in
order to soften the loss in market share. Thus, the possibility of relocation
for the merged ﬁrm implies a reduction of both price and market share for
the outsider, and this could potentially cause the well-known free-rider
effect to vanish.
Proposition 3: When transportation costs are linear in distance, a merger
participant earns higher proﬁts than a non-participant if the cost of relo-
cation is sufﬁciently small.
Proof: Inserting lim
b!0
d from (15) into (13)–(14), we ﬁnd that
p3  p1 < 0
if
ð119 5 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ385p Þa
252
< k <
ð119 5 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ385p Þa
252
:
Imposing the restriction k  k, we have that
p3  p1 < 0
if
3
4
a  k < ð119 5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
385
p Þa
252
ð 0:86aÞ: (
The Proposition identiﬁes a (small) range of k for which each ﬁrm would
like to participate in the merger, rather than waiting for the other ﬁrms to
merge.15
15 It is not possible to give an exact condition for when the free-rider effect
vanishes in the general case. However, if we consider the special case of costless
relocation (k ¼ 0), we ﬁnd that a merging ﬁrm obtains higher proﬁt than the
outsider if b < 1:56a. Applying the condition k  k, which in this particular case
requires b  1:43a, the relevant range is given by b 2 1:43a; 1:56a½ Þ.
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2.1.2 Numerical Examples
A better understanding of the workings of the model can be achieved by
studying Table 1, where we present the equilibrium outcomes, in terms of
relocation and proﬁts, for speciﬁc numerical examples. For a given value
of a we show how the equilibrium outcome varies with the parameter b,
which illustrates the effect of increased convexity in transportation costs.
The importance of relocation costs is captured by performing this
numerical simulation for two different levels of k – ‘‘low’’ and ‘‘high’’.
Several general patterns emerge from Table 1. Higher relocation costs
obviously reduce the equilibrium distance of relocation, and proﬁts for
the merged ﬁrm are also reduced. We also see that higher relocation costs
lead to increased proﬁts for the outside ﬁrm if the merged ﬁrm relocate
towards the outsider. Otherwise, outsider proﬁts are lower. This is also
very intuitive, since the outside ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts in equilibrium
the further away its competitors are located. A smaller distance of relo-
cation will thus only be an advantage for the outside ﬁrm if d < 0.
For a given level of a, a higher value of b has two different impli-
cations: it increases the total costs for consumers of travelling a certain
distance, and it also increases the convexity of the transportation cost
function. The former implication is reﬂected in the fact that equilibrium
proﬁts – for all ﬁrms – increase in b. Higher transportation costs reduce
the degree of competition in the market and allows all ﬁrms to charge
higher prices. More interestingly, though, we clearly see that the degree
of convexity in the transportation cost function plays a crucial role in
Table 1. Equilibrium outcomes for a ¼ 1
k ¼ 3=4 k ¼ 2
b d p1 ¼ p2 p3 b d p1 ¼ p2 p3
0 )0.1333 0.1667 0.1600 0 )0.0476 0.1587 0.1837
0.1 )0.1235 0.1703 0.1660 0.1 )0.0448 0.1634 0.1898
0.2 )0.1142 0.1741 0.1724 0.2 )0.0421 0.1681 0.1960
0.3 )0.1054 0.1781 0.1790 0.3 )0.0394 0.1729 0.2024
0.4 )0.0969 0.1821 0.1859 0.4 )0.0368 0.1776 0.2089
0.5 )0.0889 0.1862 0.1931 0.5 )0.0342 0.1824 0.2156
1 )0.0535 0.2082 0.2329 1 )0.0219 0.2068 0.2506
1.5 )0.0244 0.2321 0.2786 1.5 )0.0105 0.2307 0.2886
2 0 0.2572 0.3292 2 0 0.2572 0.3292
2.5 0.0209 0.2834 0.3843 2.5 0.0098 0.2832 0.3724
3 0.0391 0.3105 0.4431 3 0.0190 0.3093 0.4180
Merger, Partial Collusion and Relocation 255
determining the direction of relocation and, correspondingly, the free-
rider effect of a merger. An outsider earns lower proﬁts than a merger
participant if the degree of convexity in the transportation cost function
and the cost of relocation are both sufﬁciently low. In the numerical
examples of Table 1, we see that the ‘‘merger paradox’’ can only be
resolved for the case of ‘‘low’’ relocation costs. If k ¼ 3=4 and a ¼ 1, a
merger participant earns higher proﬁts than the outside ﬁrm if
b < 0:265.
2.2 Welfare
We apply the standard deﬁnition of social welfare, W , as the sum of
consumers’ and producers’ surplus, which in our case reduces to:
W ¼ v
X3
i¼1
Z z^i
z^i1
t wið Þ dz 2kd2:
With the assumptions of unit demand and a non-binding reservation price
for consumers, social welfare does not depend on prices directly, but is
given by the sum of consumers’ gross valuation, v, net of total trans-
portation and relocation costs. Thus, a welfare analysis in this kind of
model is basically an analysis along one dimension only, namely loca-
tional efﬁciency.
Using the symmetry properties of the model, the expressions for social
welfare in the merger (Wm) and no-merger (Wnm) cases, respectively, are
found to be
Wm ¼ v C 2kd2; ð16Þ
where
C ¼ 1674ad
2  270bd3  72ad þ 486bd2 þ 87a 18bd þ 11b
972
;
and
Wnm ¼ v 9aþ b
108
: ð17Þ
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Assume ﬁrst that relocation is not possible. Comparing (16) and (17), we
ﬁnd that
Wmjd¼0Wnm ¼ 
3aþ b
486
< 0:
Thus, a merger is socially harmful even if it does not lead to any relo-
cation. Post-merger there is a price difference between the merger par-
ticipants and the non-participant which implies that a larger share of
consumers is buying from the outside ﬁrm. This causes an increase in the
total outlay on transportation costs.
A closer inspection of (16) and (17) also reveals that Wm  Wnm < 0 for
the equilibrium value of d, implying that a merger is always socially
harmful. However, once two ﬁrms have merged welfare is not maximized
at d ¼ 0. Thus, from society’s point of view there are incentives for
relocation, as long as this is in the right direction. The possibility of
relocation means that the negative impact of a merger, in terms of social
welfare, could be reduced if the merger participants relocates away from
the outsider. The exact condition is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Given that a merger has taken place, relocation leads to a
welfare improvement if d 2 0; d .
Proof: From (16) we ﬁnd that
Wm dð Þ  Wmjd¼0¼
d
54
4aþ b 93daþ 15d2b 27db 108dk :
It follows that
Wm dð Þ  Wmjd¼0 > 0 iff 0 < d < d;
where
d ¼
108k þ 27bþ 93a
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
27bþ 108k þ 93að Þ260b 4aþ bð Þ
q
30b
: (
This result, which is not immediately obvious, can be explained as fol-
lows: consider the location of the consumer who is indifferent between
buying from ﬁrm 1 and 3, given by z^3. For any set of prices, the optimal
location of this indifferent consumer – in terms of locational efﬁciency –
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is mid-way between ﬁrms 1 and 3. With a merger, but without relocation,
z^3 gets too close to ﬁrm 1, because of the merger-induced price increase.
If ﬁrm 1 relocates (marginally) away from ﬁrm 3, then z^3 moves in the
same direction, but by a smaller distance than ﬁrm 1. This implies that z^3
gets relatively closer to ﬁrm 3, and thus closer to the ‘‘new’’ midpoint,
which is a welfare improvement.
Combining Propositions 2 and 4, it is apparent that a < 12 b is a nec-
essary condition for welfare improving relocations. It is difﬁcult, though,
to provide a further general characterization of the condition given in
Proposition 2, in terms of the parameters of the model. However, we can
use the expression for d to analyze three special cases. If relocation is
costless (k ¼ 0), we ﬁnd that d 2 0; d  if a 2 0:44b; 0:50bð Þ: If trans-
port costs are linear in distance (b ¼ 0), relocation is always welfare
detrimental as the condition a < 12 b cannot be satisﬁed. For quadratic
transportation costs (a ¼ 0), we know that the ﬁrms relocate in the
‘‘right’’ direction. However, it turns out that the distance of relocation is
always excessive, i.e., d > d, and thus socially undesirable, for every
value of b and k within the valid ranges.
3 Partial Collusion
So far we have assumed that the merger participants coordinate both the
price setting and the relocation decisions. These are obvious assumptions
if we regard the merged ﬁrm as a new fully integrated entity. However,
the analysis of mergers when the different outlets/products are maintained
post-merger is similar to an analysis of collusion, as long as other effects,
like, e.g., cost synergies or defection, are not considered. Thus, the model
presented in the previous section might also be interpreted as a cartel
where the participants coordinate their decisions with respect to both
strategic variables. Therefore, it is also interesting to ask the question of
how the analysis would change if ﬁrms were able to coordinate decisions
with respect to only one of the variables. There are several reasons why
partial collusion might be relevant. For example, antitrust legislation may
make price coordination infeasible, or at least difﬁcult. It is reasonable to
assume, though, that coordination of relocation decisions is much less
likely to be prohibited by antitrust authorities. Other examples where
partial collusion might be relevant include franchises, or regulation, in
which the franchiser/regulator decides locations (prices) of the ﬁrms, but
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lets these compete in prices (locations). As another example of partial
collusion in prices, we can think of a situation in which the ﬁrms inde-
pendently make relocation investments, anticipating that two of the ﬁrms
might merge or collude in the future.16
3.1 Collusion in Prices but Not Location
To carry out this analysis we should ﬁrstly notice that we cannot a priori
apply an argument of symmetry for the relocation distances of the col-
luding ﬁrms, since they must be treated as independent variables. Thus,
let di denote the distance of relocation, measured in the clockwise
direction, with respect to its original position for ﬁrm i. Consequently, the
location of the indifferent consumers between ﬁrm i and ﬁrm iþ 1, z^i, is
found by solving
pi þ t z^i  i 1
3
 
þ di
 
¼ piþ1 þ t i
3
þ diþ1  z^i
 
;
while the proﬁts are given by
pi ¼ piMi  kd2i ¼ pið^zi  z^i1Þ  kd2i : ð18Þ
At stage two of the game, ﬁrms 1 and 2 are assumed to coordinate their
price setting. Proﬁt maximization leads to a system of equilibrium prices
pi d1; d2; d3ð Þ, i ¼ 1; 2; 3. By substituting pi d1; d2; d3ð Þ back into (18), we
can express proﬁts as functions of the relocation distances only.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game the colluding ﬁrms act independently, so
that each ﬁrm maximizes individual proﬁts by choosing di. Using the fact
that, by symmetry (a posteriori), d2 ¼ d1 and d3 ¼ 0, proﬁt maximi-
zation yields the following solution for the optimal relocation of ﬁrm 1:
dp :¼ d1 ¼ 1944ak þ 171abþ 648bk þ 87b
2  9 ﬃﬃﬃAp
18bð9aþ 5bÞ ; ð19Þ
where A > 0 is a function of the parameters of the model.17
16 In a somewhat different setting, the case of partial collusion in prices is also
considered in Friedman and Thisse (1993), who analyze a location-then-price
game when the ﬁrms anticipate collusion in prices.
17 A ¼ 46656a2 k2 þ 8208a2bk þ31104abk2 þ121a2 b2 þ 6912ab2kþ
5184b2 k2 þ154ab3 þ1392b3 k þ 49b4:
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Equilibrium prices and proﬁts are found by substituting dp for d in
(11)–(14). It is straightforward to show that dp is always nonnegative, 18
which establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 5: Under partial collusion in prices, the colluding ﬁrms will
relocate, if at all, away from the outside ﬁrm.
The intuition is found by comparing with the case of full collusion, or
merger. Consider the decision of ﬁrm 1 to possibly relocate as a response
to price collusion with ﬁrm 2. When the ﬁrms do not coordinate their
location decisions, there is an extra cost associated with moving
away from this ﬁrm (i.e., moving towards ﬁrm 3). The gain in market
share vis-a`-vis ﬁrm 3 is accompanied by a loss of market share to ﬁrm 2.
Consequently, the competition effect always dominates, and the ﬁrms
engaged in price collusion will move closer together.
It is worth noting that the special case of linear transportation costs
(b ¼ 0) implies no relocation. From (19) we ﬁnd that
lim
b!0
dp ¼ 0:
The intuition is relatively straightforward. In this case price competition is
not reduced by moving further away from ﬁrm 3, and there is no net gain
of market share by moving in either direction.
3.2 Collusion in Location but Not Prices
When the ﬁrms coordinate their location decisions but compete in prices,
the analysis is similar. The two main differences are that at the second
stage ﬁrms maximize individual proﬁts, whereas at the ﬁrst stage the
colluding ﬁrms maximize joint proﬁts with respect to the relocation
decisions. Following the same procedure as in the previous section, and
again applying arguments of symmetry, it is directly shown that prices are
given by
18 It can be shown that
k >
5aþ bð Þb
16ð3aþ bÞ
must be satisﬁed to ensure an interior solution and equilibrium existence.
260 P. Posada and O. R. Straume
p1 ¼ p2 ¼ ð5 3dlÞð3aþ 3bdl þ bÞð3a 6bdl þ bÞ
9ð15a 12bdl þ 5bÞ ; ð20Þ
p3 ¼ ð3aþ 3bdl þ bÞð15a 15bdl þ 5bþ 18adl  9bd
2
l Þ
9ð15a 12bdl þ 5bÞ ; ð21Þ
with corresponding proﬁts
p1¼p2¼ð53dlÞ
2ð6a3bdlþ2bÞð3a6bdlþbÞð3aþ3bdlþbÞ
54ð15a12bdlþ5bÞ2
kd2l ;
ð22Þ
p3 ¼ ð3aþ 3bdl þ bÞð15a 15bdl þ 5bþ 18adl  9bd
2
l Þ2
27ð15a 12bdl þ 5bÞ2
; ð23Þ
where dl :¼ d1 ¼ d2ð Þ is the interior solution of the ﬁfth-degree poly-
nomial deﬁned by @ðp1 þ p2Þ=@d1 ¼ 0.
Unfortunately, and due to the ﬁfth-degree nature of the problem, it is
impossible to ﬁnd an explicit expression for the interior solution. It can be
shown, though, that dl < 0 for every permissible value of the parameters.
Again, the intuition is clearly tractable. If the ﬁrms do not coordinate their
location and price decisions at all, we know that neither ﬁrm has any
incentive to relocate, since the increased competition with the closer
neighboring ﬁrm more than offsets, in terms of proﬁts, the decrease in
competition with the other neighbour. However, if two of the ﬁrms are
able to coordinate their location decisions, they can make sure, by both
moving in the direction of the third ﬁrm, that the decrease in the degree of
competition between them is sufﬁciently reduced to more than compen-
sate for the increase in the degree of price competition with the third
ﬁrm.19 Moreover, as there is not any agreement between the colluding
ﬁrms to increase their price, the outsider faces stronger competition and a
lower market share, which eliminates any free-riding effect and even
lowers its proﬁts compared to the situation with no collusion. The next
proposition summarises these results:
19 The unique case which permits tractable analysis is the one with linear
transportation costs (b ¼ 0), in which dl ¼  5a3ð25kaÞ, where k > 925 a ensures an
interior solution. The quadratic case (a ¼ 0) with no relocation costs (k ¼ 0)
implies dl ¼ 0:027.
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Proposition 6: With partial collusion in location,
(i) the colluding ﬁrms relocate towards the outsider and make higher
proﬁts than this ﬁrm,
(ii) the outsider makes less proﬁts, compared with the case without
collusion.
3.3 Welfare and Proﬁt Comparisons
For the case of partial collusion in locations, it is easily shown that social
welfare is maximized at d ¼ 0. This is an obvious result. Since prices are
set non-collusively, total transportation costs are always minimized with
symmetric locations. Furthermore, it is also possible to show that partial
collusion in locations is always preferred, from a welfare point of view, to
full collusion (or merger). For the special cases of linear and quadratic
transportation costs, it is also possible to show that partial collusion in
prices is preferred to total collusion. Again, this is not too surprising.
Comparing welfare for the two different kinds of partial collusion, it
can also be shown, for the case of linear transportation costs, that partial
collusion in locations is socially preferred to partial collusion in prices if
the cost of relocation is sufﬁciently large.20
The private incentives for the different kind of collusion do not nec-
essarily correspond with the social incentives. For the colluding ﬁrms, full
collusion is preferred to price collusion, which is preferred to collusion in
location. For the outsider, full collusion and price collusion are both
preferred to collusion in location. However, collusion in prices might be
preferred to full collusion, at least for linear transportation costs.
4 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse how horizontal mergers
might create incentives for relocation within a framework of spatial
competition, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation might
affect both the proﬁtability of a merger and proﬁts of non-participating
20 For the case of b ¼ 0 we ﬁnd that social welfare is higher with partial
collusion in locations, compared with partial collusion in prices, if and only if
k > 125 ð19þ 6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
31
p Þa.
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ﬁrms, as well as locational efﬁciency (social welfare). In order to facilitate
analytical tractability, we have used a rather simple set-up, where we
consider a two-ﬁrm merger in an industry with three price-setting ﬁrms
initially located in symmetric fashion on a circle. Under the assumption
that ﬁrms are not able to price discriminate between consumers at dif-
ferent locations, we have considered both a full merger and partial col-
lusion in either price setting or relocation decisions.
We have found that a merger will generally lead the merger par-
ticipants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and
depends on the characteristics of the transportation cost (disutility)
function. Regarding the effects of a merger on the proﬁts of the non-
participating ﬁrm, the possibility of relocation implies that the well-
known free-rider effect could be either mitigated or reinforced,
depending on the direction of relocation. If a merger leads to a relo-
cation in the direction of the outside ﬁrm, we have shown the existence
of a set of parameter values – characterised by low relocation costs and
a low degree of convexity in the transportation cost function – for
which the free-rider effect vanishes. This paves the way for the main
message of the paper, namely that the possibility of relocation could
solve the ‘‘merger paradox’’ even in the absence of price discrimina-
tion.
Regarding social welfare, the possibility of relocation could dampen
the negative effect of a merger, although a merger in this setting (without
any cost synergies) is always welfare detrimental. Finally, if ﬁrms engage
in partial collusion, we have found that (except for the special case of
linear transportation costs) incentives for relocation are always present,
but the direction of relocation depends on whether the ﬁrms collude in
prices or location decisions. In the former case, the colluding ﬁrms will
relocate away from the non-colluding ﬁrm.
Due to the complexities involved in performing a joint analysis of the
questions of merger and location choices in a spatial framework, we have
been forced to consider a fairly particular set of assumptions. Important
questions that are not touched upon in our analysis include the possibility
of entry to the industry. We have also made the analysis tractable by
setting up a three-ﬁrm analysis. In this setting, the non-participating ﬁrm
does not have an incentive to relocate as a response to a merger. Gen-
erally, though, with more than three ﬁrms, we would expect the relocation
incentives of non-participating ﬁrms also to be affected by a merger. In
particular, we would expect non-participating ﬁrms to have incentives to
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relocate in a direction that increases the total distance to the neighboring
ﬁrms. However, a more general analysis would be analytically intractable
within the present context. Thus, the present analysis should perhaps be
seen as a ﬁrst stepping stone towards a more comprehensive under-
standing of the effects of merger and collusion in a spatial framework.
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